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Abstract 
Freedom of speech for all citizens is often considered as a cornerstone of democratic societies. 
In three studies, we examined the relationship between cognitive ability and support for 
freedom of speech for a variety of social groups across the ideological spectrum (N1 varies 
between 1373 and 18719, N2 = 298, N3 = 395). Corroborating our theoretical expectations, 
although cognitive ability was related to more affective prejudice towards relatively 
conservative groups, and less affective prejudice towards relatively liberal groups (Study 2), 
people with higher levels of cognitive ability were more in favor of freedom of speech for all 
target groups (Study 1 – 3). The relationship between cognitive ability and freedom of speech 
support was mediated by intellectual humility (pre-registered Study 3). These results indicate 
that, cognitive ability contributes to support for the democratic right of freedom of speech for 
all social-ideological groups. 
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The present series of studies investigates the support for freedom of speech - a 
fundamental right in democratic societies that is protected by both national (e.g. US 
Constitution) and international (e.g. UN General Assembly, 1948) law. In many countries, 
people attach great value to freedom of speech (Pew Research Center, 2019), and it is often 
described as key to a well-functioning democracy. However, calling upon freedom of speech 
rights can be used strategically, such as when there is a tension between protecting freedom of 
speech and protecting people from prejudiced discourse (White & Crandall, 2017). For 
example, in the context of hate speech, Roussos and Dovidio (2018) showed that people 
holding anti-black bias were more likely to consider hurtful acts targeting Black people as 
protected by free-speech rights. Similarly, White and Crandall (2017) demonstrated that racial 
prejudice is a reliable predictor of the “free speech defense” of racist expression, but not of 
free speech in general. As such, recent research on freedom of speech support has often 
focused on group-specific reasons and beliefs about whether freedom of speech of particular 
groups should be promoted or curbed. However, in the present research, we aimed for a 
broader perspective by examining cognitive ability as a general predictor of support for 
freedom of speech for a wide variety of social groups.  
Over the past decades, cognitive ability has been demonstrated to play an important 
role in a broad range of social phenomena, including social judgments. Notably, a recent 
meta-analysis by Onraet et al. (2015), spanning more than sixty years of empirical research, 
revealed a negative association between cognitive ability and prejudice. However, using a 
large, representative US sample, Brandt and Crawford (2016) demonstrated that higher 
cognitive ability was indeed related to less affective prejudice towards the traditionally 
studied groups (replicating the meta-analytic results of Onraet et al. 2015), but also to more 
affective prejudice towards conservative groups like Christian fundamentalists and the 
military, leading them to conclude that: “people with both relatively higher and lower levels 
of cognitive ability show approximately equal levels of intergroup bias but toward different 
sets of groups” (p. 884). 
These findings raise the question about how cognitive ability is related to support for 
freedom of speech for groups across the ideological spectrum. Does this relationship mimic 
the group-dependent relationship between cognitive ability and affective prejudice? Or is 
cognitive ability associated with support for freedom of speech across the ideological 
spectrum, even for disliked ideological groups? We expect the latter to be true. Indeed, 
although people with higher (versus lower) cognitive abilities may relatively dislike certain 
conservative groups (as per Brand and Crawford, 2016), we argue that they are also more 
appreciative of the virtues of open debates with a free flow of information, divergent ideas, 
and criticism, to foster knowledge and informed decision making. Indeed, cognitive ability is 
positively related to intellectual humility (Zmigrod, Zmigord, Rentfrow, & Robbins, 2019). 
Intellectual humility is defined by a person’s independence of intellect and ego, openness to 
revising one’s viewpoint, respect for others’ viewpoints, and a lack of intellectual 
overconfidence, and is therefore argued to promote human thriving through tolerance of 
other’s ideas, collaboration, and civil discourse (Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016). Indeed, 
people with higher levels of intellectual humility are less inclined be judgmental of people 
with whom they disagree (Leary et al. 2017). Hence, if people high in cognitive ability show 
more genuine openness and respect for other viewpoints compared to people lower in 
cognitive ability, they should display an overall stronger support for any group to exercise its 
freedom of speech. Therefore, as the key hypothesis of this research, we expected a positive 
association between cognitive ability and tolerance towards all groups, both relatively liberal 
and conservative, to express and disseminate their ideas in society. 
  
Study 1 
We analyzed 21 waves of data from the General Social Survey, collected between 
1974 and 2018 in the US, to examine the relationship between cognitive ability and attitudes 
towards freedom of speech for various social groups across the ideological spectrum. 
Method 
 Sample. 
 The General Social Survey (GSS; Smith, Davern, Freese, & Morgan, 2019) is the 
largest national public opinion survey of the US (Caplan & Miller, 2010). The data are 
collected by the National Opinion Research Centre at the University of Chicago. Since 1972, 
thirty-two (cross-sectional) waves of data have been collected. To maximize the robustness of 
our findings, we included all waves in our analyses that included measures for both cognitive 
ability and attitudes towards freedom of speech for at least one specific social group. The 
sample size varied between N = 1,373 and N = 18,719, depending on the specific social group, 
and is presented in Table 1. A power sensitivity test demonstrated that our smallest sample 
had 80% power to detect standardized odds ratios > 1.20 or < 0.83. 
 Measures. 
 Cognitive ability. In all retained waves of GSS, a vocabulary test (i.e., Wordsum) was 
included as a measure of cognitive ability. In this test, participants are presented with ten 
target words, and each target word is accompanied by a lists of five words. Participants are 
instructed to select a word from the list with a meaning closest to the target word. For all 
reported analyses, Cronbach’s α varied between .62 and .72, and the mean of correct answers 
varied between 5.98 (SD = 2.11) and 6.06 (SD = 2.21). Since it has repeatedly been 
demonstrated that vocabulary knowledge is highly related to general intelligence (e.g. 
Pearson, 2012), many investigations, including the Brandt and Crawford (2016) study that 
advanced the affective bias symmetry hypothesis, have used the number of correct answers on 
this specific test as a proxy of cognitive ability or intelligence (see also e.g., Caplan & Miller, 
2010; De keersmaecker & Roets, 2017). 
 Freedom of speech. We identified three types of questions in the GSS that tap into 
attitudes towards freedom of speech for seven different social groups.1 Participants were 
presented with these social groups, and were asked for each social group: a) whether or not a 
member of this social group should be allowed to speak in the participant’s community, b) 
whether or not a member of this social group should be allowed to teach in a college or 
university, and c) whether or not a book that favors the ideas of this social group should be 
allowed in the library. Participants answered all questions dichotomously. For waves that also 
included a measure of cognitive ability, the following social groups were included in the GSS: 
two groups that are generally perceived as politically conservative: racists (20 waves between 
1976 and 2018) and militarists (20 waves between 1976 and 2018), and four groups that are 
generally perceived as politically liberal: homosexuals (21 waves between 1974 and 2018), 
socialists (1 wave in 1974), anti-religionists (21 waves between 1974 and 2018) and 
communists (21 waves between 1974 and 2018). Finally, six waves (between 2008 and 2018) 
also included Muslim clergymen who preach hatred of the US.  
All verbatim questions and data are available at https://osf.io/w3knb/.  
Results 
The relationships between cognitive ability and attitudes towards freedom of speech 
for racists, militarists, homosexuals, anti-religionists and communists were examined 
through Generalized Linear Mixed Modelling. In each model, we included a fixed effect of 
cognitive ability, and a random intercept for time of measurement. Models with a random 
slope for cognitive ability yielded virtually identical results, but did not converge for some 
                                                          
1This study thereby goes well beyond Carl’s (2014) analysis of cognitive ability and ‘social 
liberal beliefs’ which included one item for three selected groups as part of a broader set of 
items. 
groups because the cognitive ability – outcome association was highly stable across years. 
The simultaneous inclusion of both cognitive ability and attitudes towards freedom of speech 
for socialists was limited to only one wave, and the relationship between cognitive ability and 
attitudes towards freedom of speech of anti-American Muslim clergymen was too similar 
across years to converge a model with a random effect of year. Therefore, attitudes towards 
freedom of speech for socialists and for anti-American Muslim clergymen were examined 
using Logistic Regression Modelling (without the random effect of time of measurement). 
Analyses were conducted with the Lmer4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) and 
LmerTest (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2017) packages in R. 
The odds ratio’s (OR) of the analyses for all target groups are reported in Table 1. All 
variables were (re)coded as such that an OR < 1 indicates that higher levels of cognitive 
ability are related to weaker support for free speech, whereas OR > 1 indicates that higher 
levels of cognitive ability are related to stronger support for free speech. Table 1 represents 
the overall results across years. The results revealed that, when participants’ levels of 
cognitive ability increase, the odds for allowing members of a particular social group to give a 
speech in the community, for allowing books that favor the ideas of the social group in the 
library, and for allowing members of the social group to teach, significantly increase, and this 
is the case for every specific target group. All OR were significant at p < .001. The LogOdds, 
S.E., Z-scores, and random effects of year (if applicable) of these analyses are available on 
OSF. Moreover, as illustrated by Panel A and Panel B of Figure 1, the relationships between 
cognitive ability and supporting free speech were stable across years: Panel A represents the 
detailed results by year for the relationship between cognitive ability and allowing militarists 
to speak, whereas Panel B represents the relationship by year between cognitive ability and 
allowing anti-religionists to speak. Separate results for each year and each group on all 
individual outcome measures are available at OSF.  
Table 1. Results of Study 1. 
  Allowing to speak Allowing books in library Allowing to teach 
Target group OR [95% CI] N OR [95% CI] N OR [95% CI] N 
Racists 
1.233 
17155 
1.261 
16967 
1.158 
16895 
[1.214, 1.252] [1.241, 1.281] [1.141, 1.176] 
Militarists 
1.297 
17138 
1.338 
16992 
1.218 
16803 
[1.276, 1.318] [1.316, 1.360] [1.199, 1.237] 
Homosexuals 
1.402 
18422 
1.347 
18401 
1.338 
18314 
[1.376, 1.428] [1.325, 1.370] [1.315, 1.361] 
Socialists 
1.270 
1401 
1.338 
1381 
1.177 
1373 
[1.194, 1.351] [1.260, 1.421] [1.118, 1.238] 
Anti-religionists 
1.374 
18719 
1.356 
18463 
1.271 
18269 
[1.351, 1.397] [1.334, 1.378] [1.252, 1.290] 
Communists 
1.402 
18429 
1.399 
18298 
1.264 
17850 
[1.379, 1.426] [1.376, 1.423] [1.245, 1.284] 
Anti-US Muslim 1.396 
4298 
1.412 
4303 
1.356 
4275 
clergy  [1.347, 1.447]  [1.363, 1.464]  [1.307, 1.408] 
   
 
A) B)  
 
Figure 1. Detailed results by year for the relationship between cognitive ability and allowing 
militarists to speak (Panel A), and allowing anti-religionists to speak (Panel B), with 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
  
Study 2 
Study 1 provided support for our hypothesis that cognitive ability is positively related 
to support for freedom of speech for various groups across the ideological spectrum. 
However, given that the GSS includes a greater number of presumably relatively ‘liberal’ 
groups than ‘conservative’ groups, we conducted a second study to examine the association 
between cognitive ability and freedom of speech with a more balanced set of social groups, 
adding the ‘conservative’ groups for which Brandt & Crawford (2016) reported the strongest 
positive associations between cognitive ability and affective prejudice: Christian 
fundamentalists, members of the big business industry, and the Tea Party. Additionally, we 
included measures of affective prejudice to confirm Brandt & Crawford’s (2016) observation 
that cognitive ability is indeed related to more prejudice towards conservative groups, and to 
less prejudice towards liberal groups. 
Method 
 Participants. To obtain a power of > .90 to detect effects of r = .20, three-hundred US 
citizens whose native language is English were requested on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Two 
hundred ninety-eight participants completed the study (Mage = 39.59 years, SDage = 12.03, 
51.0% female, 49.0% male). Of the participants, 0.7% indicated grade school or less as their 
highest obtained degree, 11.1 % indicated high school, 30.6% indicated to attended some 
college (13 grades or more but no degree), and 57.6% indicated to have obtained a college or 
advanced degree. Furthermore, 80.2% identified as White, 7.4% as Black, 5.4% as Asian or 
Pacific Islander, 0.3% as American Indian or Alaska Native, 1.7% as Hispanic, and 4.7% as 
‘other’ or identification with multiple groups.  
Procedure and measures. After completion of the demographic variables, and the 
same measure of cognitive ability as in Study 1 (M = 7.01, SD = 1.79, Cronbach’s α = .64), 
participants were presented with the following social groups: 1) racists, 2) Christian 
fundamentalists, 3) people who belong to the big business industry, 4) members of the Tea 
Party, 5) militarists, 6) socialists, 7) homosexuals, 8) anti-religionists, 9) communists, and 10) 
anti-American Muslim clergymen. Each social group was accompanied by the following 
description and questions (adapted from GSS): “There are always some people whose ideas 
are not shared by other people. For example, [social group] with very outspoken ideas. 1) If 
such a person wanted to make a speech in your city/town/community about his/her ideas, 
should (s)he be allowed to speak, or not? 2) Should such a person be allowed to teach in a 
college or university, or not? 3) If such a person wrote a book about his/her ideas, should it be 
allowed in the public library of your community, or not?” All questions were answered on 5 
point Likert scales (1= absolutely not allowed, 5 = absolutely allowed), and for each social 
group responses were combined into an internally consistent scale (see Table 2). 
 Next, we also measured affective prejudice using Brandt & Crawford’s (2016) 
procedure. Participants rated the 10 social groups on feeling thermometers ranging from 0 = 
unfavorably and cold, to 100 = favorably and warm. Similar to Brandt and Crawford (2016), 
responses were recoded so that higher scores indicate more affective prejudice (see Table 2). 
Thereafter, participants were again presented with the social groups, and were asked to 
indicate how they perceive the overall ideological position of each social group on 7-point 
Likert scales (1 = Strongly liberal, 7 = Strongly conservative) (See Table 2). These additional 
items served to check whether, and to what degree, the particular groups were indeed 
perceived as ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’. Finally, participants also reported their own 
ideological position on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = very liberal to 7 = very conservative; M = 
3.55, SD = 1.86). 
All verbatim questions, correlation tables with all variables, and data are available at 
OSF. 
  
Results  
 Main analyses. As reported in Table 2, perceptions of the social groups included in 
our study ranged from being strongly liberal to strongly conservative. Replicating the results 
of Brandt and Crawford (2016), cognitive ability was associated with less affective prejudice 
towards social groups that are perceived as liberal, (i.e., socialists, homosexuals, and anti-
religionist), whereas cognitive ability was associated with more affective prejudice towards 
social groups that are perceived a conservative (i.e., militarists, people who belong to the big 
business industry, members of the Tea Party, and Christian fundamentalists). Notably, 
cognitive ability was not significantly related to affective prejudice towards the social groups 
who received the highest levels of affective prejudice in general while also being perceived as 
not particularly liberal or conservative (i.e. communists, anti-American Muslim clergymen, 
and racists). Because these groups were generally (very) disliked, ceiling effects may explain 
the lack of significant relationships between cognitive ability and prejudice towards these 
groups.  
Most importantly and similar to Study 1, cognitive ability was positively related to 
supporting the freedom of speech for each social group. That is, irrespective of the perceived 
ideological position (liberal-conservative) of the social group, and even for social groups that 
are the targets of more affective prejudice by people with relatively higher levels of cognitive 
ability, cognitive ability was positively related to supporting their freedom of speech.  
Controlling for gender, ethnicity, and education did not meaningfully alter the 
associations between cognitive ability and support for freedom of speech. Also controlling for 
participants’ ideology (separately or in addition to the demographic variables) did not 
meaningfully affect the associations. Partial correlations can be found at OSF. 
  
Table 2. Results of Study 2. 
  Ideol. pos Prejudice   FOS CA - prejudice   CA - FOS 
Target group Mean (SD) Mean (SD)   Cr.α  Mean (SD) r [95% CI] p   r [95% CI] p 
Socialists 2.01 (1.43) 54.54 (31.04)  .85 4.07 (0.96) -.17 [-.28, -.05] .004  .28 [.17, .39] <.001 
Homosexuals 2.09 (1.34) 31.82 (29.64)  .93 4.43 (0.89) -.21 [-.33, -.10] <.001  .31 [.20, .42] <.001 
Anti-religionists 2.51 (1.59) 53.59 (32.23)  .92 4.12 (1.11) -.18 [-.29, -.07] .002  .34 [.23, .44] <.001 
Communists 3.20 (2.01) 78.42 (24.12)  .88 3.62 (1.22) -.10 [-.22, .01] .075  .34 [.23, .45] <.001 
A.A. Musl. Clergy 4.34 (2.03) 88.99 (19.77)  .87 2.86 (1.37) .08 [-.03, .20] .161  .23 [.12, .34] <.001 
Racists 5.32 (1.84) 94.73 (11.95)  .83 3.01 (1.29) .06 [-.05, .18] .271  .20 [.09, .32] <.001 
Military 5.32 (1.18) 40.95 (32.21)  .85 3.71 (1.11) .14 [.03, .25] .014  .13 [.02, .25] .022 
Big Business 5.33 (1.57) 57.57 (28.05)  .86 4.28 (0.86) .22 [.11, .33] <.001  .20 [.08, .31] .001 
Tea Party 5.64 (1.59) 68.90 (28.40)  .87 3.97 (1.04) .13 [.02, .25] .023  .15 [.04, .27] .009 
Christ.Fund. 6.28 (1.37) 62.06 (31.69)   .83 3.79 (1.07) .25 [.13, .36] <.001   .13 [.02, .25] .020 
Perceived ideological position (Ideol. Pos), affective prejudice, support for freedom of speech 
(FOS), correlations between cognitive ability (CA) and affective prejudice, and correlations 
between cognitive ability and support for freedom of speech. 
 
Additional analyses. Although positive relations between cognitive ability and 
freedom of speech were found for all groups, it may be interesting to explore whether the 
perceived ideology of the groups affected the magnitude of the relationships under study. 
Therefore, we ran a linear mixed model with random intercept for participants, with freedom 
of speech support as the outcome, and with centered versions of cognitive ability, average 
perceived outgroup ideology, and their interaction as predictors. Results revealed that in 
addition to the effect of cognitive ability (β = .21, p < .001) and perceived ideology of the 
target group (β = -.14, p < .001), a small, but significant interaction emerged (β = -.05, p < 
.001). Hence, although the relationship between cognitive ability and freedom of speech 
support was positive and significant for all groups (see Table 2), it was more pronounced for 
more liberal groups compared to more conservative groups.  
Finally, to explore the potential moderating role of participant’s own ideology, we ran 
a linear mixed model with random intercepts for participants and target groups, with freedom 
of speech support as the outcome, and with centered versions of cognitive ability, 
participants’ ideology, and their interaction as predictors. This analysis revealed that cognitive 
ability (β = .25, p < .001) and participants ideology (β = .14, p < .001) did not interact (β = -
.06, p = .085) on supporting freedom of speech. 
Study 3 
Study 2 showed that although higher cognitive ability is related to less affective 
prejudice towards liberal groups, and more affective prejudice towards conservative groups 
(corroborating Brandt & Crawford, 2016), cognitive ability was related to supporting freedom 
of speech for all included social groups, thereby replicating the findings from Study 1. To 
further test the robustness of these relationships, we conducted a third, pre-registered study, in 
which we also tested whether the associations between cognitive ability and freedom of 
speech support are mediated by intellectual humility. (Pre-registration: https://osf.io/9w5vp/) 
Method 
 Participants. Power analysis revealed that, under the assumption that the independent 
variable (i.e. cognitive ability), mediator (i.e. intellectual humility), and outcome (supporting 
free speech) are interrelated at r = .15, 450 participants would provide a power of .80 to detect 
indirect effects. To anticipate a dropout of 10%, we requested 495 participants who lived in 
the US and whose native language is English on Mturk. A total of 515 participants started the 
study, and 495 completed the full study (Mage = 38.23 years, SD = 11.66; 51.5% female, 
47.9% male, 0.6% non-binary). As pre-registered, these ‘additional participants’ were 
included in the analyses. Of the participants, 0.2% indicated grade school or less as highest 
degree, 8.7% indicated high school, 28.8% indicated to have attended some college (13 grades 
or more but no degree), and 62.0% indicated to have obtained a college or advanced degree. 
In the sample, 77.4% identified as White, 9.3% as Black, 4.6% as Asian or Pacific Islander, 
0.4% as American Indian or Alaska Native, 3.6% as Hispanic, and 4.2% as ‘other’ or 
identification with multiple groups. 
Procedure and measures. After responding to demographic questions, participants 
completed a (verbal) cognitive ability measure, i.e. the Ammons Quick Test (Ammons & 
Ammons, 1962). This test is more elaborate than the basic verbal ability test in Study 1 and 2, 
hence also serving to demonstrate the robustness of the results. Participants are presented with 
4 pictures and 50 words, and are instructed to assign each word to one of the pictures (see e.g. 
De keersmaecker et al. 2019, and Hall, Holton, Öngür, Montrose, & Keshavan, 2019 for 
recent uses of the test). The amount of correct answers is used as an index for cognitive ability 
(M = 39.56, SD = 6.44, Cronbach’s α = .89). Next, on 5-point Likert scales, participants 
completed Krumrei-Mancuso and Rouse’s (2016) 22-item Comprehensive Intellectual 
Humility Scale (M = 3.67, SD = 0.59, Cronbach’s α = .91) , and the same measures for support 
for freedom of speech as in Study 2. Finally, participants indicated their political position on a 
7-point Likert scale (1 = very liberal to 7 = very conservative; M = 3.54, SD = 1.77). 
Correlation tables with all variables, and all data are available at OSF. 
Results 
 Main analyses. We pre-registered two hypotheses. Hypothesis 1: Cognitive ability is 
positively related to supporting freedom of speech for all included target groups (i.e. total 
effect). Hypothesis 2: The predicted positive association between cognitive ability and 
supporting freedom of speech is mediated by Intellectual Humility (i.e. indirect effect). Using 
the Lavaan package (Version 0.5-23; Rosseel, 2012) in R, attitudes towards supporting 
freedom of speech for each target group was examined with a path model on the observed 
scores in which cognitive ability was included as an independent variable, and intellectual 
humility as a mediator. Standard errors were calculated using bootstrap analyses (1000 
bootstrap samples). Table 3 presents the results of these analyses (standardized coefficients). 
As predicted, and similar to Study 1 and Study 2, for all target groups, a significantly positive 
association emerged between cognitive ability and support for freedom of speech (total 
effect). Moreover, each association between cognitive ability and supporting free speech was 
significantly mediated by intellectual humility (indirect effect).  
Controlling for gender, ethnicity, and education did not meaningfully alter the 
relationships between cognitive ability and support for freedom of speech, nor the mediation 
role of intellectual humility. Also controlling for participants’ ideology (separately or in 
addition to the demographic variables) did not meaningfully alter the results, which can be 
found at OSF. 
Table 3. Results of Study 3 
  FOS   Total effect   Direct effect   Indirect effect 
Target group Cr.α  Mean (SD)   β [95% CI] p   β [95% CI] p   β [95% CI] p 
Socialists .91 3.89 (1.06)  .31 [.24, .40] <.001  .24 [.16, .33] <.001  .08 [.05, .11] <.001 
Homosexuals .96 4.26 (1.07)  .32 [.24, .40] <.001  .21 [.14, .30] <.001  .10 [.07, .14] <.001 
Anti-religionists .95 3.94 (1.15)  .32 [.24, .40] <.001  .22 [.15, .31] <.001  .10 [.06, .13] <.001 
Communists .92 3.44 (1.29)  .31 [.23, .42] <.001  .24 [.15, .34] <.001  .07 [.04, .10] <.001 
A.A. Musl. Clergy .89 2.75 (1.32)  .14 [.06, .23] .002  .07 [-.02, .16] .142  .07 [.04, .10] <.001 
Racists .87 2.78 (1.28)  .12 [.04, .23] .014  .06 [-.03, .17] .257  .06 [.03, .10] <.001 
Military .90 3.53 (1.14)  .15 [.07,.23] <.001  .07 [-.02, .15] .111  .08 [.05, .12] <.001 
Big Business .91 4.07 (0.97)  .25 [.16, .34] <.001  .18 [.09, .27] <.001  .08 [.04, .11] <.001 
Tea Party .90 3.76 (1.07)  .21 [.13, .29] <.001  .12 [.05, .21] .003  .09 [.05, .13] <.001 
Christ.Fund. .87 3.70 (1.05)   .17 [.09, .26] <.001   .11 [.02, .20] .018   .06 [.03, .10] <.001 
Support for freedom of speech, total effect of cognitive ability on support for freedom speech, 
the direct effect, and the indirect effect via intellectual humility (IH). 
 
Additional analyses. In addition to our two pre-registered main hypotheses, we also 
pre-registered secondary analyses in which we explore the mediating role of the different 
facet scales of intellectual humility. Based on the correlation pattern between cognitive ability 
and the facet scales of intellectual humility previously revealed by Zmigrod et al. (2019), we 
expected that especially ‘openness to revising one’s viewpoint’ and ‘respect for other’s 
viewpoints’ would mediate the relationship between cognitive ability and support for free 
speech. These secondary analyses confirmed that these two facet scales, together with 
‘independence of intellect and ego’ drove the mediating role of intellectual humility (see 
OSF). 
Finally, we ran the two linear mixed models identical to those described in Study 2, to 
examine the moderating role of ideology.2 These analyses yielded results that replicated those 
of Study 2. First, in addition to the effect of cognitive ability (β = .21, p < .001) and target 
groups’ ideology (β = -.14, p < .001) on supporting freedom of speech, a small but significant 
interaction (β = -.06, p < .001) indicated that the association between cognitive ability and 
supporting freedom of speech was more pronounced for relatively liberal target groups 
compared conservative groups. Secondly, cognitive ability (β = .21, p < .001) and 
participants’ ideology (β = .02, p = .471) did not interact (β = .02, p = .504) on support for 
freedom of speech. 
Discussion 
In a series of three studies, we examined the relationship between cognitive ability and 
attitudes towards a cornerstone of democratic societies: the freedom of speech for every 
citizen, irrespective of his or her ideological attitudes and beliefs. Data from the 21 waves of 
the GSS (1974 – 2018), as well as two additional studies that included an even greater variety 
of target groups, showed that cognitive ability is positively related to more support for 
freedom of speech for social groups across the ideological spectrum. Hence, individuals with 
higher cognitive abilities also advocate freedom of speech for the groups they dislike. In line 
with our theorizing, the pre-registered third study revealed that these associations are 
mediated by intellectual humility. 
 By identifying cognitive ability as a general predictor of free speech support across a 
wide array of ideological target groups, the present research complements previous work that 
identified specific mechanisms underlying free speech support towards specific outgroups. 
For example, Roussos & Dovidio (2018) demonstrated that the application of free speech 
                                                          
2The moderation analyses in both Study 2 and Study 3 were based on suggestions by the 
reviewers, and were therefore not pre-registered. The perceived ideological position of the 
target groups scores were derived from Study 2. 
rights might in some circumstances be used as a strategic mean to permit the expression of 
prejudice in society (see also, White & Crandall, 2017). Indeed, in addition to cognitive 
ability as a general predictor of supporting free speech, specific mechanisms can additionally 
underlie free speech support for particular target groups. Such target specific mechanisms 
may explain why the association between cognitive ability and freedom of speech support for 
relatively liberal groups was somewhat more pronounced than for relatively conservative 
groups. As target groups may differ on many specific characteristics, such as the extent to 
which they are perceived to be marginalized or to disseminate hate in society, the 
consideration of both general and target group specific mechanisms seems warranted for a 
more complete understanding for why and when people support freedom of speech. 
 The present contribution does not invalidate Brandt & Crawford’s (2016) observation 
that cognitive ability is related to more affective prejudice towards relatively conservative 
groups, and less affective prejudice towards relatively liberal groups. Indeed, this particular 
finding was replicated in Study 2. However, the present research provides a more detailed 
perspective on the relationship between cognitive ability and attitudes towards social groups, 
demonstrating that such a ‘mirrored pattern’ of relationships between cognitive ability and 
affective prejudice towards target groups across the ideological spectrum cannot be 
generalized to attitudes about their fundamental democratic right to freedom of speech. 
The present investigation has some potential limitations. First, all studies relied on US 
samples, a context where freedom of speech is highly valued. It may, for example, be possible 
that the strength of the relationship between cognitive ability and support for freedom of 
speech is affected by the overall level of support for freedom of speech in a given country.  
Therefore, it may be warranted to test the generalizability of the effect in other socio-political 
contexts, with possibly other ideological groups. Furthermore, the measures of cognitive 
ability in the samples of the GSS as well as in Study 2 were brief, and although commonly 
used in scientific research, their internal consistency was only passable. All results were 
replicated with another, more internally consistent measure of cognitive ability in Study 3, but 
future research may want to consider using more elaborate measures of cognitive ability. 
Finally, as most research on cognitive ability, the present investigation relied on correlation 
data, and we cannot rule out the potential role of third variables. Furthermore, the mediating 
role of intellectual humility was examined using a bootstrapping method, and it may be 
warranted in future research to further corroborate this effect in designs that manipulate the 
mediator (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). Nevertheless, we believe that the present results 
are especially compelling because the positive relationship between cognitive ability and 
freedom of speech support for both relatively liberal and conservative groups was consistently 
found in representative samples covering a period of more than 40 years, as well as in 
additional, new samples including a wide variety of target groups, and with two different 
measures of cognitive ability.  
Hence, although rather strongly formulated, the famous words of Evelyn Beatrice Hall 
in The Friends of Voltaire (Tallentyre, 1906, p. 199) seem to represent a philosophy 
particularly embraced among individuals with higher cognitive abilities: “I disapprove of 
what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it”. 
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